relation to a public issue will be subject to a special motion to strike, 2 unless the court determines there is a possibility the plaintiff may prevail on the claim. Existing law further requires that a prevailing defendant recover attorney's fees and costs on a motion to strike. 4 
Prevailing 2.
See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 435 (West Supp. 1993) (setting forth procedures for a notice of motion to strike the whole or part of a complaint).
3.
Id. § 425.16(b) (amended by Chapter 1239); see United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965) (stating that Noerr, protects from the Sherman Act a collective effort to influence public officials regardless of intent or purpose); Eastern Rail Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-38 (1961) (providing that the right to petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, therefore, in a representative democracy such as the United States, the branches of government act on behalf of the people, and the concept of representation depends upon the ability of the people to make their wishes known to the representatives); Hotel St. George Ass'n v. Morgenstern, 819 F. Supp. 310, 323 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that the tactic of suing community groups and their members to stifle the legitimate expression of opinion to the government has acquired the acronym "SLAPP suit," otherwise known as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation); Westfield Partners Ltd. v. Hogan, 740 F. Supp. 523, 525-26 (N.D. I1. 1990) (discussing SLAPP suits under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine which have been used to protect citizens communications with the government in a wide variety of cases); Florida Fern Growers Ass'n Inc. v. Concerned Citizens of Putnam County, 616 So. 2d 562, 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993 ) (recognizing that the term SLAPP was coined by two University of Denver professors, George W. Pring and Penelope Canan, who defined SLAPP suits as those which punish political opponents for past behavior in an attempt to preclude their future effectiveness and to warn others that political opposition will be punished); 600 West 115th St. Corp. v. Von Gutfeld, 603 N.E.2d 930, 933 n.l (N.Y. 1992) (characterizing SLAPP suits as actions that have been filed with little legal merit in order to burden opponents with legal defense costs and the threat of liability, and to discourage those who might wish to speak out in the future), cert. The most frequent claim asserted in a SLAPP suit is defamation or business torts; (2) suits are characterized by prayers for damage awards that are large in comparison to the resources of the defendant; (3) the defendant to a SLAPP suit will bear considerable legal costs which often discourage petitioning, even assuming the SLAPP plaintiffs do not prevail; and (4) describing SLAPP suits as frivolous). SLAPP suits may be dismissed under the Noer-Pennington doctrine which protects the right to petition the government for redress. Id Dec. 21, 1992 , at 3 (stating how a federal jury awarded Alan La Pointe $205,100 after concluding the county agency violated his First Amendment rights by filing a SLAPP suit against him).
4. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(c) (amended by Chapter 1239); see FED. R. Civ. P. I 1 (stating that the court may order a party to pay the other party's reasonable expenses if the pleading, motion, or other paper was interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needless increase in the cost of litigation); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (\Vest 1980) (providing that a court may award attorney's fees to a successful party against an opposing party in an action which has resulted in the enforcement of plaintiffs are permitted to recover attorney fees and costs if the court determines the motion was frivolous 5 or intended to cause unnecessary delay. 6 Chapter 1239 imposes a mandatory rather than permissive recovery of attorney's fees and costs by a prevailing plaintiff if the motion was frivolous or intended to cause unnecessary delay. 7 
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important rights affecting the public interest); Chambers v. Nasco Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2132-33 (1991) (providing that the district court has inherent authority, among other things, to sanction parties appearing before it for acting in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons).
5.
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5(b)(2) (West Supp. 1993) (defining frivolous as totally and completely without merit, or for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party). Existing law regulates the procedure for determining when an action against an attorney for civil conspiracy shall be allowed. ' Chapter 645 declares that the special civil proceeding provides any attorney who has been accused of civil conspiracy the right to appeal any court order as a final judgment. 2 Under existing law, attorney's fees may be awarded to a prevailing party 3 if the action results in the enforcement of an important public right, but fees may not be awarded in favor of a public entity against another public entity. 4 Chapter 645 extends the right to receive attorney's fees to
1.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.10(a) (amended by Chapter 645); see id. (providing that before a party can include a claim of civil conspiracy in a complaint filed against an attorney, the court must enter an order ruling that the party has established that there is a reasonable probability that the party will prevail on the claim); Hung v. Wang, 8 Cal. App. 4th 908, 920, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 113, 119 (1992) (stating that the legislative intent behind California Civil Code § 1714.10 was to provide protection to insurance defense attorneys who were routinely being threatened with claims that they were conspiring with their clients to avoid reaching settlements, thus forcing the attorneys to notify their malpractice carriers which resulted in higher premiums regardless of the validity of the claim); Villa Pac. Bldg. Co. v. Superior Court, 233 Cal. App (requiring that in addition to the action enforcing a public right, it must also confer a significant benefit on a large class of persons). The award is appropriate because of the necessity and the financial burden of private litigation to enforce the bill, and justice requires that the fees not be paid out of the recovery. public entities provided that the action involves another public entity as an adversary. 5 Fees awarded to public entities pursuant to Chapter 645 will not be increased or decreased by an extrinsic circumstance multiplier. 6 Cir. 1978 ) (holding that an award of attorney's fees from a common fund to a city against the trustee for the townsite was permissible and within the district court's discretion); SENATE FLOOR ANALYSIS OF SB 764, at 2 (Aug. 25, 1993) (discussing the unfairness of the provision excluding an award of attorney's fees to public entities in all circumstances, and instead advocating, in cases where two public entities are adversaries, an award to the prevailing public entity to enable small public entities to compete with their larger well-funded counterparts).
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6. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (amended by Chapter 645); see id. (stating that the multiplier based upon extrinsic circumstances, discussed in Serrano v. Priest, does not apply to fees awarded to public entities); Serrano, 20 Cal. 3d at 49, 569 P.2d at 1316-17, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 328 (discussing the appropriate use of extrinsic factors to evaluate the adequacy of the award such as: (1) The novelty of the questions involved and the skill exhibited in presenting them; (2) the extent to which involvement in the lawsuit limited the lawyers from taking on other projects; (3) the contingent nature of the award; (4) the likelihood that an award against the state would fall upon the taxpayers; (5) the use of public and charitable funding to bring lawsuits of the nature involved; (6) the fact that the award will not confer an individual benefit on the attorneys, but instead go to the organization for which they work; and (7) the contribution of each law firn involved to the success of the lawsuit). 4 Existing law sets forth the method to bring an action for relief for unfair competition.' Chapter 926 provides that such actions may only be brought in a court of competent jurisdiction. 6
1.
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COmMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2205, at 1, (May 19, 1993). The intent of Chapter 926 is to expedite the review process and eliminate the need to pass a large number of small bills. Id.; see id. (stating that although the changes made through the expedited process may be minor, they are important). The Judiciary Committee takes into consideration suggestions received from the bench and Bar in order to present a single collection of minor civil procedure changes. SENATE FLOOR ANALYSIS OF AB 2205, at 2 (Aug. 19, 1993); id. (stating that changes instituted by Chapter 926 are more than simply "maintenance of the codes," but they are not controversial and do not involve significant policy considerations). Existing law provides that superior courts may prepare local rules designed to expedite and facilitate the business of the court. 7 Existing law also prohibits local rules from being inconsistent with statutory law or Judicial Council rules. 8 Chapter 926 authorizes municipal and justice courts to follow the same procedures as superior courts in adopting local rules. 9 Chapter 926 states that any rules which apply solely to particular branches or districts of a court are to be published as part of the general publication of rules required by the California Rules of Court." 0 Existing law provides that the service of a subpoena duces tecum" is invalid unless a copy of the affidavit is served on the person served with the subpoena.' 2 after the rule is adopted, at least 61 copies are to be filed with the Judicial Council, and a copy is to be deposited with each county law library and each county clerk for public examination). Each court shall make its local rules available for inspection and copying in every location of the court that generally accepts filing of papers, and may charge a reasonable fee and page limit for copying. Id.
10.
Id. § 575.1 (c) (amended by Chapter 926); see id. (stating that the rules must be organized sequentially by court, branch, or district and that these rules are considered local rules for requirements set forth in the Judicial Council rules applicable to local court rules); see also ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 425, at 1-2 (July 14, 1993) (discussing the changes made to California Code of Civil Procedure § 575.1 which were ultimately made by Chapter 926; however, the statutory changes under this section were also proposed by SB 425, but they were superseded by Chapter 926).
11. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1987.5 (amended by Chapter 926) (defining a subpoena duces tecum as requiring the appearance and the production of matters and things at a deposition).
12.
Id.
deposition subpoenas requiring only the production of business records for copying. 13 Existing law provides the manner in which deposition subpoenas requiring only the production of business records for copying may be delivered.
14 Prior law sets forth options for delivery that the custodian of the records may choose.' 5 Chapter 926 changes the wording of this subdivision to state that the custodian of the records shall elect one of the methods.
16
Existing law specifies the procedure for reading, correcting, and signing the original transcript of an oral deposition that is stenographically recorded. 17 Chapter 926 revises this procedure to require that the deposition officer shall send notice to the deponent and to all parties that the transcript is available when the original transcript for each session is completed, or if all the parties agree, when the entire deposition is over. Existing law provides that the managing association' of a common interest development (CID) 2 has standing relating to matters pertaining to enforcement of governing documents, 3 damage to common areas, 4 or damage to, or arising from damage to, separate interests 5 or common areas that the association is obligated to maintain or repair, unless the governing documents of the association provide otherwise. 6 Chapter 151 provides that these associations have standing without regard to any provisions contained in the governing documents. 7 Existing law provides that, subject to certain provisions relating to creditor claims 8 in the administration of estates of decedents, 9 if an action survives against a person who dies before the expiration of the applicable limitations period, the action may be commenced within one year after the date of death, and no other limitations period applies. 10 Chapter 151 provides that the limitations period is also subject to rules on the payment of claims, debts,"' and expenses from revocable trusts 2 ) (holding that a condominium owners association had standing to sue a developer for damages to the common areas of the condominium project caused by the developer prior to formal organization of the association); Del Mar Beach Club Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Imperial Contracting Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 898, 906, 176 Cal. Rptr. 886, 890 (1981) (holding that where individual owners in an apartment building only purchased the "air space" in their units, and the planned development complex owners association had acquired title to the common areas, real property and building structures, the association had standing to bring a cause of action); Raven's Cove Townhomes, Inc. v. Knuppe Development Co., 114 Cal. App. 3d 783, 790-93, 171 Cal. Rptr. 334, 337-39 (1981) (holding that the owners association had standing to sue for damages for landscaping defects in common areas of a condominium project, but did not have standing to sue for damages to individually owned condominium units). 11. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 19000(f) (West Supp. 1993) (defining debt as all claims, all expenses of administration, and all other proper charges against the trust estate, including taxes). settlors. 13 Chapter 151 provides that the one-year limitations period is not tolled or extended for any reason. Existing law forbids health care providers' from disclosing medical information 2 concerning a provider's patients 3 without obtaining authorization, 4 except under certain specified circumstances.' Under
12.
See id § 19000(d) (West Supp. 1993) (defining trust as a trust described in California Probate Code § 18200, or, if a portion of a trust, that portion that remained subject to the power of revocation at the deceased settlor's death) 13 . 
1.
See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146(c)(2) (West 1990) (defining health care provider as any person, clinic, health dispensary, health facility, or legal representative of a health care provider licensed to administer health care in the ordinary course of business).
2. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.05(b) (West Supp. 1993) (defining medical information as data originating from a health care provider concerning a patient's medical history).
3. See id. § 56.05(c) (fVest Supp. 1993) (defining patient as an individual, dead or alive, who has been given medical services from a health care provider).
4. See id. § 56.05(a) (Vest Supp. 1993) (explaining that authorization means permission given to release medical data); id. § 56.11 (West 1982) (stating that a health care provider has the authority to release medical data if the authorization: (1) Is handwritten by the individual who signs it or is typed with 8-point type or larger; (2) is clearly distinct from any other words on the same piece of paper, and is signed for the purpose of granting the authorization; (3) is signed and dated by the patient, or the patient's legal representative, spouse, beneficiary, or personal representative; (4) specifies the intended uses and limitations on the types of medical data to be revealed; (5) indicates the name or functions of the health care provider who may divulge the information; (6) existing law, a health care provider who illegally discloses a patient's medical records 6 may be liable for compensatory damages, 7 punitive provides the name or functions of the persons or entities entitled to obtain the data; (7) signifies the uses and limits placed on those persons or entities entitled to obtain the information; (8) states the date upon which the data may no longer be disclosed; and (9) apprises the person signing the authorization that that person may obtain a copy of the authorization).
5.
Id. § 56.10(a)-(c) (13) (providing that persons who participate in a cardiac catheterization program must furnish statistical data and patient information for effectively evaluating the program, and procedures will be established to protect the confidentiality of the patient information); id. § 1250.9(a),(h) (West Supp. 1993) (noting that privilege procedures will be put in place to assure the confidentiality of patient data gathered during any postsurgical care programs); cf ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-714(B)(1) (1986) (providing that a tuberculosis control officer has the authority to review medical data regarding the condition of tuberculosis patients, and such information will remain confidential and will not reveal the identity of the patient to whom the data relates); CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92 (West Supp. 1993) (establishing that a psychotherapist is required to warn or protect others from a patient's threatened volatile behavior where the patient has conveyed to the therapist a serious threat of bodily harm against a person who can be readily identified); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-630(d) (West 1992) (providing that information regarding a minor's treatment for alcohol or drug dependence cannot be divulged to that minor's parents without the minor's consent); Johnson v. McMurray, 461 So. 2d 775, 778 (Ala. 1984) (noting that a doctor and the doctor's patient share a confidential relationship); Tarasoff v. Regents of U. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 442, 551 P.2d 334, 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 27 (1976) (holding that the patient-psychotherapist privilege must give way to situations where disclosure is necessary to prevent harm to others); lnabnit v. Berkson, 199 Cal. App. 3d 1230, 1239, 245 Cal. Rptr. 525, 531 (1988) (holding that when a plaintiff fails to assert the psychotherapist-patient privilege, such non-action is equivalent to a waiver of the privilege); Colorado v. District Court, 719 P.2d 722, 724 (Colo. 1986) (stating that the aim of the psychologist-patient privilege is to effectuate a proper diagnosis and treatment of the patient by sheltering the patient from any shame that might result from the psychologist's disclosure of their discussions during treatment); Tumlinson v. Texas, 663 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Tex Ct. App. 1983 ) (noting four exceptions to the patient-client privilege: (1) When the patient brings suit against the professional; (2) when the patient waives the privilege; (3) when the intent of the suit is to substantiate and collect on a claim for mental or emotional health services provided to the patient; or (4) when the patient has spoken with a professional pursuant to a court ordered exam and has been informed that such discussions will not be deemed confidential). But see Zelin, supra note 5, at 691-92 (explaining that some jurisdictions do not adhere to the common law rule that the patient and the physician have a right to keep their communications private, nor have they enacted statutes protecting such a privilege).
6. See CAL. INS. CODE § 791.02(q)(l)-(2) fVest 1993) (defining medical records as personal data which concerns a person's physical or mental condition, medical history or treatment, and is obtained from a medical professional, the individual, or the individual's wife, husband, mother, father, or legal guardian).
7. See CAL CIv. CODE § 3281 (Vest 1970) (providing that a person who is damaged from the unlawful act of another may be compensated monetarily by the wrong doer); People v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 56 Cal. App. 3d 593, 604, 128 Cal. Rptr. 697, 704 (1976) (noting that the law of compensatory damages is based on the idea that an individual who is harmed should be justly and sufficiently compensated for his injuries). damages, 8 attorney's fees, 9 and litigation expenses. 10 Chapter 1004 provides that any corporation, organized primarily for the purpose of maintaining medical information to be made available to the patient or to a health care provider upon request, l " will be considered a health care provider.' 2 Such a corporation is required to maintain the same level of confidentiality, and will be subjected to the same punishment for a breach of that confidentiality as any other health care provider. 3 Existing law allows a health care provider to disclose medical information regarding a patient to the Insurance Commissioner, the Division of Industrial Accidents, the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, and the Department of Insurance. 4 Chapter 1004 adds the Commissioner of Corporations and the Department of Corporations to the
8.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1993) (stating that exemplary damages may be available to a plaintiff where the defendant has breached his duty and is guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, in addition to being liable for the actual damages, for the sake of setting an example of the defendant or to punish the defendant).
9. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146(a)(I)-(4) (West 1990) (setting the limited amounts that an attorney can collect in fees when representing a client seeking damages against a health care provider based upon that person's alleged professional negligence); see also CAL. CIv. CODE § 1717(a) (Vest Supp. 1993) (providing that where a contract allows for the reimbursement of attorney's fees and costs, the prevailing party is entitled to recover them). REV. 557, 577 (1989) (noting that AIDS is a sensitive area in the medical field, and recognizing that a hospital could face a civil suit if it breaches the physician-patient confidentiality by revealing an AIDS patient's identity); In re Karlin, 112 B.R. 319, 322 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1999) (holding that a plastic surgeon did not breach his fiduciary duty to his patient by using his patient's pictures for instructional purposes, as authorized by the patient, in an article regarding his practice).
11. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.06(a) (enacted by Chapter 1004) (stating that the request for medical data must be made by the patient or health care provider).
12.
Id.; see id.
(providing that such a corporation will be considered a health care provider whether for purposes of diagnosis, treatment, or other purposes). See generally Controversy Over Breast Implants Sparks Registt', ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 24, 1992, at H3 (stating that the Medic Alert Foundation is an organization which furnishes personal and medical information).
13. CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.06(b), (c) (enacted by Chapter 1004). 14.
Id. § 56.30(k) (amended by Chapter 1004); see id. § 56.10(c)(I 1) (West Supp. 1993) (stating that a health care provider may disclose medical information to an insurer, provided that the insurer has complied with all of the necessary requirements for obtaining such information); cf. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-913 (Michie Supp. 1993) (prohibiting private review agents from revealing medical records during the course of any utilization review activities, except to third parties with whom the agent is associated or acting on behalf of).
list of organizations to which a health care provider can disclose such information. 5 person found in contempt of court for failure to obey a court order issued pursuant to the Family Code or specified sections of the Welfare and Institutions Code shall be disciplined by a direction to complete community service instead of, or in addition to, a fine or imprisonment. 3 Under Chapter 746, if the person is found in contempt three or more times, the court is required to order: (1) Imprisonment and either a fine or community service, or imprisonment and both such fine and community service; and (2) contemnor's payment of an administrative fee for the community service. 4 
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proceedings in support cases is blurred, and that imprisonment in civil contempt proceedings is intended to be remedial by coercing the defendant to do what the defendant has refused to do).
3. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1218(c) (amended by Chapter 746); see id (authorizing punishment for failure to comply with a court order pursuant to the Family or Welfare and Institutions Code); id. § 1218(c)(1) (amended by Chapter 746) (providing that upon the first finding of contempt, the court shall order the contemnor to perform community service of up to 120 hours, instead of, or in addition to imprisonment of up to 120 hours, for each count of contempt); id. § 1218(c)(2) (amended by Chapter 746) (providing that upon a second finding of contempt the court shall order the contemnor to perform 120 hours of community service, in addition to imprisonment for up to 120 hours or a fine up to $1,000, or both imprisonment and fine, for each count of contempt); id. § 1218(c)(3)(A) (amended by Chapter 746) (providing that after three or more findings of contempt, the court shall order the contemnor to serve up to 240 hours imprisonment, and to pay a fine of $1,000 or perform community service of up to 240 hours, or both the fine and community service for each count of contempt); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-6.1-16(h) (West Supp. 1992) (providing that a party found to be delinquent in payment of child support, may be ordered to perform community service); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-32-12.1(1) (1993) (establishing a minimum of 10 hours of community service for failure to abide by an order in a divorce decree regarding visitation, or for refusing to pay child support as ordered by the court); Lesniewski v. Lesniewski, 595 So. 2d 361, 361 (La. 1992) (stating that the father was found in contempt for non-payment of child support, and ordered to serve time in jail and perform community service); Columbus v, Bickel, 601 N.E.2d 61, 64 (Ohio 1991) (stating that the defendant's jail term was suspended in lieu of three years probation, which imposed special conditions including 120 hours of community service, payment of court costs, and compliance with a child support order); State v. Nicastro, 383 S,E.2d 521, 529 (W. Va. 1989) (stating that community service has become a common alternative to sentencing, greatly outdistancing legislative activity explicitly authorizing its use). See generally ASSEBLY COMMIrTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 934, at 2, (May 13, 1993) (stating that supporters of the bill believe it is more productive for the parent to perform community service than to sit in jail, and that the opposition believes that community service will create an additional burden on probation personnel); Timothy J. Existing law requires the Judicial Council 1 to adopt judicial administration standards governing the appearance of counsel by telephone in specified pretrial proceedings in civil cases. 2 Chapter 925 provides that each county superior court shall adopt a rule enabling the appearance of counsel by telephone at trial setting conferences in civil cases.
Existing law authorizes every court to make local rules for its own government which are not inconsistent with statutes or Judicial Council rules. 4 These rules can not impose a tax, charge, or penalty upon any legal proceeding or any pleading allowed by law, nor may they give any allowance to any officer for services. 5 Chapter 925 requires the Judicial Council to adopt rules and procedures to encourage uniformity of requirements both throughout a court and statewide regarding: a) The form of papers; b) limitations on the filing of papers; c) rules relating to law and (stating that a local rule, adopted pursuant to this section, may require the personal appearance of counsel at the trial setting conferences); Trust Co. Bank v. Tingen-Millford Drapery Co., 119 F.R.D. 21, 23 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (stating that a telephone conversation between defendant's attorney and plaintiff's attorney inquiring as to the date on which an answer had to be filed constituted an appearance by implication). See generally SENATE RULES COMMIrEE, COPM61NME ANALYSIS OF SB 425, at 2 (May 27, 1993) (stating that the purpose of this chapter is to enact several provisions which will improve the administration of civil justice and enable civil litigators to utilize their time more efficiently).
4.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68070(a) (amended by Chapter 925).
5.
Id. § 68070(a)(l)- (2) Under existing law, a party deposing' any expert witness 2 is required to pay that expert's reasonable and customary hourly or daily fee for the time spent being deposed or consulted. 3 Under existing law, if the 6 .
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68070(b) (amended by Chapter 925); see, e.g., U.S. DIST. CT. R. 5.1 (S.D. Ca.) (discussing local rules on the documents submitted to the court); ORANGE COUNTY SuP. CT. R. 402 (discussing the mandatory use of local court forms in civil trials); SACRAMENTO COUNTY SUP. CT. R. 30 (describing local rules for civil law and motion departments); id. 31 (outlining local procedure for the filing of papers in law and motion departments); SAN DIEGO COUNTY Sup. CT. R. Div. 11 4.1 (discussing the format and filing of papers in a law and motion court); S.F. COUNTY Sup. CT. R. 3 (outlining local rules on law and motion departments); id. R. 6 (outlining local rules on the presentation, filing, service and maintenance of court papers).
1.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 14 (West 1982); CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 17 (West 1982) (defining depose as every mode of written statement under oath or affirmation).
2. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1878 (West 1983) (defining witness as a person whose declaration under oath is received as evidence for any purpose, whether such declaration be made on oral examination, or by deposition or affidavit); id. § 2034(a)(I)-(2) (amended by Chapter 678) (describing an expert witness as a natural person who has been retained by a party for the purpose of forming and expressing an opinion in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial); CAL. EVID. CODE § 720 (West 1966) (discussing when a person is qualified as an expert witness); id. § 801 (West 1966) (stating that the testimony of an expert witness is limited to opinions relating to a subject sufficiently beyond common experience, and the expert's special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education are of a type that may be reasonably relied upon in forming an opinion).
3. 678) ; see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2034(f)(2)(E) (amended by Chapter 678) (requiring the expert witness' declaration to include a statement of the expert's fee for depositions and for consulting with the retaining attorney); id. § 2034(i)(2) (amended by Chapter 678) (stating that a daily fee shall only be charged for a full day of attendance at a deposition or where the expert was required by the deposing party to be available for a full day where the witness had to forgo business on that day); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(c)(i) (requiring experts to be paid a reasonable fee for the time spent responding to discovery); see also Rancho Bernardo Dev. Co. v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. App. 4th 358, 361-62, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 878, 879-80 (1992) (holding that an expert's charges to an opposing party for depositions, which must be reasonable, may be greater than standard charges for investigation and consultation); Lee v. Hyster Co., 509 N.E.2d 586, 590 (II1. App. 3d 1987) (holding that the party seeking to take the deposition of an expert would be required to compensate the expert for any mileage and per diem fees incurred as the result of the deposition); George v. Eaton, 789 S.W.2d 56, 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990 ) (holding that the party deposing an expert witness must pay a reasonable fee for the time spent by the deposing party believes that the expert's fee is unreasonable, the party can move for an order setting the compensation for that expert. 4 The order must be accompanied by a declaration stating facts showing a good faith attempt at an informal resolution of the fee dispute. 5 Chapter 678 provides that the court's determination of the reasonableness of the fee shall be based on information which the expert or party designating the expert shall provide. 6 Chapter 678 provides that this information shall include: (1) Proof of the customary fee actually charged and received by that expert for similar services in past litigation; (2) the number of times the requested fee has been charged and received by the expert; (3) the frequency of which the requested fee has been charged and received by that expert in the last two years; (4) ordinary and customary fees charged by other similar experts for similar services; and (5) any other factors which the courts deems necessary and appropriate to make its determination. 7 
Id. § 2034(i)(2) (amended by Chapter 678); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68092.5(a) (amended by Chapter
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expert in preparation for the deposition); Baird v. Larson, 801 P.2d 247, 249 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990 ) (holding that only opinions acquired and developed in anticipation of litigation are expert opinions for which the expert is to be paid an expert fee by the party taking the deposition Existing law provides that a defendant may object to jurisdiction, prior to pleading, by filing specified motions.' Chapter 456 adds as an allowable motion, the motion to dismiss for delay in prosecution. 2
1.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 418.10(a) (amended by Chapter 456); see id. (authorizing the motion to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the motion to dismiss on the ground of inconvenient forum); see also Piper v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 (1981) (holding that the first question a court must ask itself in considering forum non conveniens is whether an alternate forum exists), reh'g denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982); Leet v. Union Pac. R.R., 25 Cal. 2d 605, 609, 155 P.2d 42, 44 (1944) (holding that the rule of forum non conveniens is an equitable doctrine whereby the court uses its discretionary power to decline to exercise the jurisdiction it has over a transitory cause of action, when it determines that it would be more suitable to try the case elsewhere), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 866 (1945); Coulston v. Cooper, 245 Cal. App. 2d 866, 868, 54 Cal. Rptr. 302, 303 (1966) (stating that a defendant who claims that the service of summons does not bring him within the court's jurisdiction may file a notice of motion to quash); cf. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b) (providing the defenses that may be raised by motion including: (1) Lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) lack of personal jurisdiction; (3) improper venue; (4) insufficiency of process; (5) insufficiency of service of process; (6) Existing law allows a party to object to a complaint or cross-complaint by demurrer 3 or answer, on specified grounds. Chapter 456 adds as an objection, a filing of demurrer or answer in actions brought by common interest development associations,' for failure to file a certificate of merit. ' With the enactment of Chapter 456, a plaintiff, defendant, or the court on its own motion, may file a motion for judgment on the pleadings as specified, to a pleading or a portion of a pleading. 7
3.
See 
7.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 438(c)(2)(A)-(B) (enacted by Chapter 456); see id. (stating that the motion may be made to the complaint, cross-complaint, any cause of action stated in the complaint, to the entire answer, or to one or more of the defenses set forth in the answer); id. § 438(c)(1)(A) (enacted by Chapter 456) (providing that a plaintiff may move for judgment on the pleadings when the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and defendant's answer does not state facts constituting a defense); id. § 438(c)(l)(B)(i)-(ii) (enacted by Chapter 456) (providing that a defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, or where the complaint does not state facts constituting a cause of action); id. § 438(b)(2),(c)(3) (enacted by Chapter 456) (stating that the court may, on its own motion, grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings in favor of the plaintiff when the plaintiff's Existing law allows an appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend where the court has abused its discretion. 8 Chapter 456 specifies the orders that are open to appeal, where an amended pleading is filed after the court's order. 9 Existing law allows dismissal in certain enumerated situations." Chapter 456 expands the instances in which an action may be dismissed to include occasions where objections are made to jurisdiction using the motion to quash or the motion to dismiss."
Existing law requires a party to enter a separate statement setting forth the amount of damages sought. 2 Chapter 456 integrates existing law complaint states facts constituting a cause of action, but the defendant's answer does not state facts constituting a defense; and that the motion may also be granted for a defendant where the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, or the complaint fails to state a cause of action against the defendant); id. § 438(d)-(g) (enacted by Chapter 456) (stating that the grounds for the motion shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading, that the motion for judgment on the pleadings may not be made after a pretrial conference order has been entered, or within 30 days of the initial trial date, whichever is later, unless the court permits, that the motion for judgment on the pleadings may only be made by a plaintiff after the defendant has filed an answer, or by a defendant where the defendant has already filed an answer and the time for the defendant to demur to the complaint has expired, and that the motion can be made even if it rests on the same grounds as a demurrer which was previously overruled, provided there has been a material change in applicable case law or statute); see id. § 438(h)(l)-(2) (enacted by Chapter 456) (providing that the motion for judgment on the pleadings may be granted with or without leave to amend, and when leave to amend is granted, 30 days shall be given to do so); cf. FED. R. CIv. P. (stating that an appeal is allowed from an order sustaining: (1) A demurrer to a cause of action, where the order was not as to the entire complaint; (2) a demurrer to an affirmative defense, where the order was not as to the entire answer; or (3) a motion to strike a portion of a pleading, where the order did not strike the entire pleading).
10.
Id. § 581(b)(1)-(5) (amended by Chapter 456); see id.
(stating that an action may be dismissed by: (1) A request by the plaintiff, with or without prejudice; (2) any party where all parties consent; (3) the court without prejudice, where the parties fail to appear at trial; (4) the request of one of the parties, where the other party failed to appear at trial; and (5) dismissal for delay in prosecution); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (providing for dismissal of actions).
11.
CAL. ClV. PROC. CODE § 581(h) (amended by Chapter 456); id. § 581(m) (amended by Chapter 456) (providing that the provisions of this section shall not be deemed an exclusive enumeration of the court's power to dismiss an action or complaint); see id. § 418.10 (amended by Chapter 456) (allowing objections using the motion to quash or motion to dismiss).
12. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.11 (a),(b) (amended by Chapter 456); see id. (providing that when a complaint or cross-complaint is filed to recover damages for personal injury or wrongful death, the party against whom the action is brought may at any time request a statement of the nature and amount of damages sought). If no request is made, the plaintiff shall serve the statement on the defendant before a default judgment may be entered, or if an answer is filed, at least 60 days prior to the date set for trial. Id. regarding the statement of damages sought with the law regarding default judgments by providing that the judgment awarded a plaintiff upon a defendant's default may not exceed the amount requested in the complaint or statement of damages. 13 Existing law authorizes a direct appeal from specified judgments.
14 Chapter 456 allows a direct appeal from an interlocutory judgment or an order to pay monetary sanctions in excess of five thousand dollars. a 5 Review of sanctions imposed for less than five thousand dollars must either wait until final judgment is entered, or obtain permission from the court of appeal upon petition for an extraordinary writ. 16 Existing law provides that extraordinary costs are not automatically subject to a stay of enforcement. 17 Chapter 456 requires that a bond or undertaking be filed in order to stay enforcement of specified orders. 1 "
13.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 585(a) (amended by Chapter 456); see id. (providing that a plaintiff upon proof of service of summons may request a default judgment, and the court shall enter a judgment for the principal amount demanded in the complaint or the statement of damages required by California Code of Civil Procedure Code § 425.11); cf. FED. R. CIv. P. 54(c) (providing that a judgment by default shall not be different in kind or form, or exceed in amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment).
14.
Id. § 904.1(a)(1)-(10) (amended by Chapter 456); see id. (allowing an appeal from a superior court from (1) a judgment, except as otherwise provided; (2) an order made after a judgment made appealable by paragraph one; (3) an order granting a motion to quash or a motion to stay or dismiss for forum non conveniens; (4) an order granting a new trial or denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; (5) an order discharging or refusing to discharge an attachment or granting a right to attach order, (6) an order granting or dissolving an injunction, or refusing to grant or dissolve an injunction; (7) an order appointing a receiver; (8) an interlocutory judgment, order, or decree made or entered in an action to redeem real property; (9) an interlocutory judgment in an action for partition; (10) an order made appealable by the Probate Code or the Family Code).
15.
Id. § 904.1(11),(12) (amended by Chapter 456).
16.
Id. § 904.1(b) (amended by Chapter 456); see Kerr v. United States Dist. Ct., 426 U.S. 394, 402-03 (1975) (discussing the difficulty in obtaining writ review in the federal system, and the need to discourage piecemeal litigation); In re Robert S., 9 Cal. App. 4th 1417, 1420, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 489,491 (1992) (stating that an order allowing a writ reflects a determination that the petitioner has no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law): Omaha Indem. Co. v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1266, 1272,258 Cal. Rptr. 66, 69 (1989) (explaining that relief by the extraordinary writ is so hard to obtain because of court congestion and the fear of gridlock, and the fact that as the case proceeds, the importance of the issue may diminish); see also id. 
18.
Id. § 917.1(a)(l)-(3) (amended by Chapter 456); see id. (requiring an undertaking to stay the enforcement for a judgment or order: (1) for money; (2) for costs awarded for failure of a party to accept a fair compromise offer which otherwise would not have been awarded as costs; and (3) costs awarded pursuant to a judgment in a trial de novo that is less favorable than the arbitration award, which otherwise would not have been awarded as costs); see also Bank of San Pedro v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 4th 797, 799, 838 P.2d 218, 219, Chapter 456 grants discretion to the courts to stay an award of costs in all other cases upon the filing of a sufficient bond.' 9 Existing law specifies that attorney's fees are allowable as costs when provided for by contract or statute. 20 Chapter 456 provides that attorney's fees may also be awarded when authorized by law. 21 Existing law allows the names of qualified jurors' for the superior court to be made publicly available, upon request, unless the court 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696, 697 (1992) (holding that the enforcement of an award of expert witness fees is not automatically stayed while the judgment is appealed). The appellant must post an appeal bond or other sufficient undertaking to obtain a stay pending appeal. 
SAK
1.
See CAL. CIr. PROC. CODE § 1940) (Vest Supp. 1993) (defining "qualified juror" as a person who meets the statutory qualifications for jury service).
determines that there is a compelling governmental interest requiring that juror information be kept confidential or its use limited. 2 Existing law permits any person to petition the court for access to these records. 3 Upon such a petition, these records shall be made available, absent a finding of continued government interest. 4 Chapter 632 provides that a judge shall inform jurors, before they are discharged from a criminal case, of their right to request that personal juror 2.
Id. § 237(a) (amended by Chapter 632); see id. § 206(f) (amended by Chapter 632) (allowing a defendant or defendant's counsel to request personal information about jurors, including names, addresses, and telephone numbers, in order to communicate with jurors for the purpose of developing issues on appeal); id. § 237(b) (amended by Chapter 632) (recognizing the government's interest in protecting jurors from physical harm or threats of physical harm); id. § 237(d) (amended by Chapter 632) (allowing the court to limit access to the juror identification records to the defendant and the defendant's counsel or investigator, for the purpose of developing issues on appeal or for any lawful purpose); CAL. PENAL CODE § 95.1 (Vest Supp. 1993) (recognizing it to be a public offense to threaten a juror with respect to criminal proceedings in which a verdict has been rendered); In re Globe Newspaper Co. v. Hurley, 920 F.2d 88, 98 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that juror names and addresses must be made public unless there are special circumstances, such as juror safety, to justify nondisclosure). The desire of the jurors and the beliefs of the judge that the names and addresses of the jurors should be confidential, are not sufficient justifications to withhold their identities. Id.; see also Karen Nikos, Jurors' Identities in Beating Case to be Kept Secret, PHOENIX GAzETTE, Feb. 12, 1993, at A6 (stating that the judge in the Reginald Denny beating case ruled that the identities of the jurors would be kept secret because of the publicity involved, and the potential for violence). The article also stated that some legal experts feel that extraordinary steps used to keep jurors' identities anonymous could signify an alarming trend toward a less accountable judicial system. Id.; cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1867(d) (1968) (allowing parties to use any relevant records and papers used by the jury commissioner or clerk to support a motion challenging the selection of the jury); id. § 1867(f) (1968) (stating that the contents of records or papers used by the jury commissioner or clerk in connection with the jury selection process shall not be disclosed except to the parties during the preparation and pendency of a motion on the jury selection process); Gannett Co. v. State, 571 A.2d 735, 742 (Del. 1989) (holding that the trial court's order to keep the names of jurors, who were to serve in a highly publicized murder trial, unannounced, was within the trial court's judicial power), later proceeding, State v. Pennell, 583 A.2d 1348 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990). cert. denied, Gannett Co. v. Delaware, 495 U.S. 918 (1990) . See generally Jury Pool Small for Beating Trial, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 5, 1993, at A8 (discussing the judge's ruling that the names of the jurors in the Rodney King civil rights case be kept confidential to prevent harassment of the jurors); Joyce Price, Two Jurors Threatened After Paper Prints Names, WASH. TIMES, May 2, 1992 , at A10 (reporting that two jurors from the Rodney King trial had received threatening phone calls after their names and cities of residence had appeared in local papers, and that these papers had received many phone calls in protest of their printing the juror information).
3.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 237(c) (amended by Chapter 632).
4.
Id.; see Baltimore Sun v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that the First Amendment right of access to judicial records can be denied only by proof of a compelling government interest and proof that the denial is narrowly tailored to serve that interest); In re Baltimore Sun, 841 F.2d 74, 75-76 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that once the jury had been chosen, newspapers were entitled to the names and addresses of jurors and alternates sitting in a criminal case); see also Paul Langer, US Appeals Court to Decide Confidentiality of Jurors' Names, BOSTON GLOBE, June 3, 1990 , Metro, at 82 (discussing the dispute between keeping the names of jurors confidential and making them available for public viewing); Elizabeth Neuffer, Jurors' Names Not Secret, the U.S. Appeals Court Rules, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 29, 1990 , Metro, at 37 (discussing the ruling that a federal judge cannot withhold ajury list from the public after a trial unless the judge determines that the juror's lives are at risk).
identification information be sealed. 5 Chapter 632 requires the court to give notice 6 to affected jurors of any petition for access to their confidential juror information so that the juror can appear at the hearing to protest the granting of the petition. 7 Existing law allows any party to move for summary judgment in an action when it is contended that there is no merit or defense to the action. 1 Existing law states that a cause of action has no merit if one or more of the elements of the cause of action, even if separately pleaded cannot be separately established, or a defendant establishes an affirmative defense to the cause of action. 2 Existing law provides that once the moving party has met the burden of proof, 3 the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show that a triable issue of material fact exists. 4 Under Chapter 276, the non-moving party may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleading to meet the burden of proof. 5 Chapter 276 requires the non- 6 Existing law allows a party to move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, 7 or one or more issues of duty. 8 Chapter 276 states that a motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty. 9 825 (1990) (refusing to apply the rule in Celotex because it is not binding on state courts, and under California Code of Civil Procedure § 437c the moving party generally must negate the issues which the non-moving party will have the burden of proving at trial, even where the moving party enjoys a presumption affecting the burden of proof at trial).
MJP
7. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 3294(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1993) (providing that a claim for exemplary damages exists if: (1) In an action for breach of an obligation other than contract it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice; or (2) in an action against an employer where the employer had advance knowledge of the employee's unfitness and employed him with a conscious disregard for the safety of others).
8. CAL. Ctv. PROC. CODE § 437c(f)(1) (amended by Chapter 276); see Danieley v. Goldmine Ski Assoc., 218 Cal. App. 3d 111, 126-28, 266 Cal. Rptr. 749, 758-60 (1990) (ruling that summary judgment was proper because an affidavit stating that a woman ran into a tree thirty feet off the ski run was insufficient to support the central issue of whether the ski resort had a duty to remove the tree); Southland Corp. v. Superior Court, 203 Cal. App. 3d 656, 664-68, 250 Cal. Rptr. 57, 61-63 (1988) (finding a triable issue of fact in whether a proprietor owed a duty to an invitee who was attacked by third parties in the lot adjacent to his liquor store because there was evidence that the owner's lease allowed non-exclusive use of the adjacent parking lot, the owner's parking lot was inadequate, and customers regularly used that lot); Northrop Corp. v. Stinson Sales Corp., 151 Cal. App. 3d 653, 657-58, 199 Cal. Rptr. 16, 18-19 (1984) (stating that settlement with one or more tortfeasors in good faith is sufficient to warrant a summary judgment dismissing that tortfeasor from the action because settlement of a claim in good faith is a complete defense).
9. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(f)(1) (amended by Chapter 276); see Andalon v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. App. 3d 600, 605, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899, 901 (1984) (stating that if material facts are dispositive of one of the claims the prevailing party is entitled to partial summary judgment). If material facts are dispositive of summary adjudication is granted, existing law declares that those causes of action, affirmative defenses, claims for damages, or issues of duty are established and allows the action to continue as to the remaining causes, defenses, claims, or issues. 10 Chapter 276 states that the fact that summary adjudication has been granted as to one or more causes of action, affirmative defenses, claims for damages, or issues of duty within the action shall not operate to bar any cause, defense, claim, or issue as to which summary adjudication was either not sought, or was denied. 1 " Chapter 276 forbids a party, witness, or the court from commenting on the grant or denial of a motion for summary adjudication when an objection is made to the motion for summary adjudication. Under existing law, an individual is guilty of a misdemeanor if that individual commits a trespass by driving a vehicle' upon the property of something else, however, such as an element of a cause of action or defense, the prevailing party is only entitled to a declaration that there is no material issue as to that element of the cause of action or defense. another without the owner's consent. 2 Chapter 793 exempts any person making a lawful service of process 3 from this provision. 4 Existing law obligates a judgment creditor to personally serve a copy of an order that requires the presence of a judgment debtor before a court to furnish information that will facilitate the enforcement of the money judgment.' Chapter 793 limits the creditor's delivery options by restricting the available mode to personal delivery. escheat 13 to the state if unclaimed or unpaid for more than three years after the funds become payable. 4 Existing law also provides that a life insurance policy not matured by actual proof of death,' 5 is deemed matured and the proceeds payable, under certain conditions, 6 providing that no activity, as specified, 1 7 occurs within a certain period of time.'
Chapter 692 reduces the period of inactivity required for maturation of a policy not matured by actual proof of death to three years. 19 Existing law provides that any intangible interest 2° in a business association escheats to the state after three years, under specified conditions. 22 Chapter 692 establishes additional requirements for notice 23 which must be given to such interest holders before the interest may escheat to the state. 24 Existing law provides that securities 25 listed on an established stock exchange which escheat to the state, must be sold at the prevailing price on that exchange. 26 Chapter 692 provides that such securities must be sold within one year of their receipe 7 by the Controller. 28 23. See id. § 1516(d) (amended by Chapter 692) (requiring the association to give notice by mail to the owner not less than six months nor more than twelve months prior to the time the interest will escheat to the state, and to provide the owner with a form by which the owner can confirm his or her current address, and specifying that if the form is signed and returned, the escheat provisions will not operate); cf. N.Y. ABAND. PROP. LAW. § 501.2.b(iii) (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 1993 ) (requiring notice of potential escheat be given to shareholders during the calendar year prior to the year in which the security will escheat). 
